Technology Transfers for Climate Change

39 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2012 Last revised: 22 Dec 2012

See all articles by May Elsayyad

May Elsayyad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Munich Graduate School of Economics (MGSE)

Florian Morath

Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck; Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

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Date Written: October 24, 2012

Abstract

This paper considers investments in cost-reducing technology in the context of contributions to climate protection. Contributions to mitigating climate change are analyzed in a two-period public goods framework where later contributions can be based on better information, but delaying the contribution to the public good is costly because of irreversible damages. We show that, when all countries have access to the new technology, countries have an incentive to invest in technology because this can lead to an earlier contribution of other countries and therefore reduce a country's burden of contributing to the public good. Our results provide a rationale for the support of technology sharing initiatives.

Keywords: private provision of public goods, environmental public goods, climate change, technology sharing, uncertainity, irreversibility

JEL Classification: H41, Q52, D62, D83, F53

Suggested Citation

Elsayyad, May and Morath, Florian, Technology Transfers for Climate Change (October 24, 2012). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2012–09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2166205 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2166205

May Elsayyad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Munich Graduate School of Economics (MGSE)

Kaulbachstrasse 45
München, 80539
Germany

Florian Morath

Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck ( email )

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

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