Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes

48 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2012 Last revised: 15 Dec 2013

See all articles by Klaus Abbink

Klaus Abbink

Monash University

Utteeyo Dasgupta

Wagner College-Department of Economics

Lata Gangadharan

Monash University

Tarun Jain

Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe- takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.

Keywords: harassment bribes, experiment, asymmetric penalty, retaliation

JEL Classification: C91, K42

Suggested Citation

Abbink, Klaus and Dasgupta, Utteeyo and Gangadharan, Lata and Jain, Tarun, Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes (September 2013). Indian School of Business WP ISB-WP/104/2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2166221 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2166221

Klaus Abbink

Monash University ( email )

23 Innovation Walk
Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3800
Australia

Utteeyo Dasgupta

Wagner College-Department of Economics ( email )

Staten Island, NY 10301
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/utteeyodasgupta/

Lata Gangadharan

Monash University ( email )

23 Innovation Walk
Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3800
Australia

Tarun Jain (Contact Author)

Indian School of Business (ISB), Hyderabad ( email )

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