Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes

48 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2012 Last revised: 15 Dec 2013

See all articles by Klaus Abbink

Klaus Abbink

Monash University

Utteeyo Dasgupta

Fordham University; IZA; Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Lata Gangadharan

Monash University

Tarun Jain

Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe- takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.

Keywords: harassment bribes, experiment, asymmetric penalty, retaliation

JEL Classification: C91, K42

Suggested Citation

Abbink, Klaus and Dasgupta, Utteeyo and Gangadharan, Lata and Jain, Tarun, Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes (September 2013). Indian School of Business WP ISB-WP/104/2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2166221 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2166221

Klaus Abbink

Monash University ( email )

23 Innovation Walk
Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3800
Australia

Utteeyo Dasgupta

Fordham University ( email )

113 West 60th Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/utteeyodasgupta/home

IZA ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

Lata Gangadharan

Monash University ( email )

23 Innovation Walk
Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3800
Australia

Tarun Jain (Contact Author)

Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad ( email )

Vastraour
Ahmedabad, 380015
India

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
351
Abstract Views
2,444
rank
119,174
PlumX Metrics