Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes
48 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2012 Last revised: 15 Dec 2013
Date Written: September 2013
This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe- takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.
Keywords: harassment bribes, experiment, asymmetric penalty, retaliation
JEL Classification: C91, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation