Placing 'REINS' on Regulations: Assessing the Proposed REINS Act

39 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2012 Last revised: 5 Jan 2017

See all articles by Jonathan H. Adler

Jonathan H. Adler

Case Western Reserve University School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Date Written: October 25, 2012


Over the past several decades, the scope, reach and cost of federal regulations have increased dramatically, prompting bipartisan calls for regulatory reform. One such proposed reform is the Regulations of the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (REINS Act). This proposal aims to restore political accountability to federal regulatory policy decisions by requiring both Houses of Congress to approve any proposed "major rule." In effect, the REINS Act would limit the delegation of regulatory authority to federal agencies, and restore legislative control and accountability to Congress. This article seeks to assess the REINS Act and its likely effects on regulatory policy. It explains why constitutional objections to the proposal are unfounded and many policy objections overstate the REINS Act’s likely impact on the growth of federal regulation. The REINS Act is not likely to be the deregulatory blunderbuss feared by its opponents and longed for by some of its proponents. The REINS Act should be seen more as a measure to enhance accountability than to combat regulatory activity.

Keywords: REINS Act, federal regulation, agency oversight, administrative law, delegation, political accountability, delegated authority, Congressional Review Act, executive authority

JEL Classification: K23

Suggested Citation

Adler, Jonathan H., Placing 'REINS' on Regulations: Assessing the Proposed REINS Act (October 25, 2012). 16 New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 1 (2013), Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-33, Available at SSRN:

Jonathan H. Adler (Contact Author)

Case Western Reserve University School of Law ( email )

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