A Comparison of Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In Tariffs as Legislative Mechanisms to Provide Renewable Power Incentives: Impacts on Power Supply, Transmission, and Grid Intermittency

KLRI Journal of Law and Legislation, Vol. 1, p. 93, 2011

Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 12-48

35 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2012 Last revised: 15 Dec 2012

Steven Ferrey

Suffolk University Law School

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

A federalist form of government is used in several important nations, including the United States, Germany, India, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Malaysia, and Switzerland. A federalist form of government divides political sovereignty between a central federal authority and constituent states or provinces. To implement new government policy regulating private power, the challenging transcendent issues are legal and regulatory, rather than technical. Certain measures in various industrialized countries, when implemented at the state rather than federal level, must be designed and implemented carefully to achieve a legal, regulatory fit in a federalist system of government.

For purposes of comparison, this article considers the recent initiatives in many of these countries to alter the energy infrastructure from fossil-fuel to renewable energy options. While not all federalist systems in the world are the same, the United States offers a rubric for analysis. With close examination of policies attempted to be implemented by states in the United States, this article examines legal issues arising in implementing policies in a federalist system. Many things can go wrong or right, with more regulatory issues than first apparent.

Suggested Citation

Ferrey, Steven, A Comparison of Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In Tariffs as Legislative Mechanisms to Provide Renewable Power Incentives: Impacts on Power Supply, Transmission, and Grid Intermittency (2011). KLRI Journal of Law and Legislation, Vol. 1, p. 93, 2011; Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 12-48. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2167316

Steven Ferrey (Contact Author)

Suffolk University Law School ( email )

120 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108-4977
United States

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