Media Persuasion and Voter Welfare

63 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2012

See all articles by Saptarshi Ghosh

Saptarshi Ghosh

Shiv Nadar University

Peter Postl

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

Jaideep Roy

Deakin University - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 15, 2012

Abstract

We study information transmission where an informed media, whose interests are partially in conflict with a finite group of rational voters, transmits news items in an attempt to manipulate democratic decisions. In a common-interest two-alternative voting model where due to reputation concerns the media can credibly commit to send any news reliably, we show that even if voters welcome the news when it arrives, media's presence can hurt their ex-ante welfare in both large and small constituencies.

Keywords: Persuasion, Reputation, Media, Voting, Welfare

JEL Classification: D60, D71, D72, D82

Suggested Citation

Ghosh, Saptarshi and Postl, Peter and Roy, Jaideep, Media Persuasion and Voter Welfare (March 15, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2167638 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2167638

Saptarshi Ghosh

Shiv Nadar University ( email )

NH-91, Village- Chithera, Tehsil-Dadri,
Dist. Gautam Buddha Nagar, UP
Gautam Buddha Nagar, Uttar Pradesh
India

Peter Postl

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
0121 414 7786 (Phone)
0121 414 7377 (Fax)

Jaideep Roy (Contact Author)

Deakin University - Department of Economics ( email )

Australia

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