Strange Bedfellows? - Voluntary CSR Disclosure and Politics

Accounting and Finance 53 (2013) 867–903. doi: 10.1111/acfi.12033

Posted: 31 Oct 2012 Last revised: 24 Oct 2015

Paul A. Griffin

University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management; University of California, Davis

Estelle Sun

Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Date Written: February 12, 2013

Abstract

We show a reliable association between voluntary CSR disclosure and company political interests, which we proxy by company employees’ contributions to political action committees and statewide voting in presidential elections. This relation is most pronounced for the contributions of Democratic employees at companies in states that vote for the Democratic presidential candidate. We also show a positive association between corporate political contributions and excess stock returns. A portfolio strategy of investing based on company size, CSR disclosure intensity, and corporate political contributions produces a significant positive mean excess stock return of 4.5 percent over three months following CSR disclosure.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility, voluntary disclosure, stock market response, corporate political contributions, political action committees, presidential voting

JEL Classification: G14, M41, M45, K22, Q20

Suggested Citation

Griffin, Paul A. and Sun, Estelle, Strange Bedfellows? - Voluntary CSR Disclosure and Politics (February 12, 2013). Accounting and Finance 53 (2013) 867–903. doi: 10.1111/acfi.12033. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2168578 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2168578

Paul A. Griffin (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management ( email )

3102 Gallahger Hall
Davis, CA 95616
United States
(530) 752-7372 (Phone)
(425) 799-4143 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsm.ucdavis.edu/griffin/

University of California, Davis ( email )

3102 Gallahger Hall
Davis, CA 95616
United States
(530) 752-7372 (Phone)
(425) 799-4143 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsm.ucdavis.edu/griffin/

Estelle Yuan Sun

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States
1-617-353-2353 (Phone)

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