An Examination of the Legal Liability Associated with Outsourcing and Offshoring Audit Procedures

Posted: 17 Feb 2013

See all articles by Alex Lyubimov

Alex Lyubimov

University of Central Florida - Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting

Vicky Arnold

NHH Norwegian School of Economics; University of Central Florida

Steve G. Sutton

University of Central Florida; NHH Norwegian School of Economics

Date Written: November 1, 2012

Abstract

Accounting firms have steadily increased the use of outsourcing and offshoring of professional services including independent audit procedures. While firms suggest the work is of higher quality and similar litigation risk, questions remain as to whether public perceptions may be more negative. This paper examines liability associated with an audit failure when work is performed by another office of the same firm or outsourced to a separate firm, and whether the work is performed domestically or in another country. Results indicate main effects for outsourcing on compensatory damages and an interaction between outsourcing and offshoring on punitive damages. Surprisingly, jurors assess higher than expected litigation awards for a failure by another domestic office of the firm for punitive damages. This result suggests that the close proximity in terms of both geography and organizational distance of the domestic office of the firm leads jurors to find the audit failure less understandable. Post hoc analyses indicate that potential jurors perceive that work completed by another domestic office of the firm has the highest expected quality and lowest risk, while work that is outsourced-offshore is expected to be lowest quality and highest risk — consistent with proximity theory.

Suggested Citation

Lyubimov, Alex and Arnold, Vicky and Sutton, Steve G. and Sutton, Steve G., An Examination of the Legal Liability Associated with Outsourcing and Offshoring Audit Procedures (November 1, 2012). Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2170187

Alex Lyubimov (Contact Author)

University of Central Florida - Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting ( email )

University of Central Florida
P.O. Box 161400
Orlando, FL 32816-1400
United States

Vicky Arnold

NHH Norwegian School of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

University of Central Florida ( email )

University of Central Florida
P.O. Box 161400
Orlando, FL 32816-1400
United States
3217455000 (Phone)
32127 (Fax)

Steve G. Sutton

NHH Norwegian School of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

University of Central Florida ( email )

4000 Central Florida Blvd
Orlando, FL 32816
United States

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