Coping with Risks Through Mismatches: Domestic and International Financial Contracts for Emerging Economies

International Finance, Winter 2004, Vol. 7, Issue 3, pp. 349-390, DOI: 10.1111/j.1367-0271.2004.00142

42 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2012 Last revised: 3 Jan 2013

See all articles by Augusto de la Torre

Augusto de la Torre

Columbia University, School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA), Students

Sergio L. Schmukler

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: December 1, 2004

Abstract

We analyse how short termism, dollarization and foreign jurisdictions are ways of coping with systemic risks prevalent in emerging economies. These are symptoms at least as much as problems. We conclude first that under high systemic risks, the market equilibrium settles in favour of investor protection against price risk (through short-duration peso and dollar contracts) instead of protection against default risk. Second, the option value to litigate in the event of default, which is higher in dollar and foreign-jurisdiction contracts, may explain this equilibrium outcome and, more generally, the 'original sin'. Third, dollar contracts trump short-duration peso contracts as a risk-coping device; they are a better hedge against inflation volatility and are superior at mitigating the risk of loss given default. Fourth, according to a conservation principle, the mitigation of risk via the use of a coping mechanism allows additional risk taking in other forms, leaving total risk unchanged.

Keywords: currency mismatch, dollarization, financial crises, emerging markets finance, financial development, maturity mismatch, risk management

JEL Classification: F33, F34, F36, G15, G18

Suggested Citation

de la Torre, Augusto and Schmukler, Sergio, Coping with Risks Through Mismatches: Domestic and International Financial Contracts for Emerging Economies (December 1, 2004). International Finance, Winter 2004, Vol. 7, Issue 3, pp. 349-390, DOI: 10.1111/j.1367-0271.2004.00142. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2172472

Augusto De la Torre (Contact Author)

Columbia University, School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA), Students ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY
United States

Sergio Schmukler

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN MC 3-301
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-4167 (Phone)
202-522-3518 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/s/sergio-schmukler

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