Post-War Institutional Shocks - the Divergence of Italian and Japanese Corporate Governance Models

University of Siena Department of Economics Working Paper No. 234

48 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2000

See all articles by Fabrizio Barca

Fabrizio Barca

Bank of Italy - Research Department

Katsuhito Iwai

The Japan Academy; The University of Tokyo; International Christian University

Ugo Pagano

University of Siena - Department of Economics

Sandro Trento

Bank of Italy

Abstract

After the first section, introducing some typical problems of family capitalism, the following three sections of the paper consider the ambiguity of the legal framework defining the modern corporation, the two way relation between technology and property rights and the different mechanisms by which the control of the firms can be transferred to new individuals. In the other sections we examine the different role that the American occupation has had in the two countries: in Italy it involved the definitive blessing and reinforcement of both State-owned corporations and family controlled pyramidal groups that had emerged during the fascist period, whereas in Japan it caused the end of the power of the great zaibatsu families. We will also consider how inter-firm share holding can promote (Japan) or inhibit (Italy) expansion of large corporations and the mechanisms that have made each model self-sustaining after the initial institutional shocks.

JEL Classification: K1, K2, P1, D2, N8

Suggested Citation

Barca, Fabrizio and Iwai, Katsuhito and Pagano, Ugo and Trento, Sandro, Post-War Institutional Shocks - the Divergence of Italian and Japanese Corporate Governance Models. University of Siena Department of Economics Working Paper No. 234, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=217572 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.217572

Fabrizio Barca

Bank of Italy - Research Department ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
00184 Roma
Italy
06/47922422 (Phone)
06/47922492 (Fax)

Katsuhito Iwai

The Japan Academy ( email )

7-32 Ueno-Koen
Taito-ku, Tokyo 110-0007
Japan
81333136235 (Phone)

The University of Tokyo ( email )

7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku
Tokyo 113-0033
Japan

International Christian University ( email )

3-10-2 Osawa
Tokyo 181-8585
Mitaka-shi, Tokyo 181-8585
Japan
81333136235 (Phone)

Ugo Pagano (Contact Author)

University of Siena - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza S. Francesco, 7
I-53100 Siena
Italy
+39 057 7232614 (Phone)
+39 057 7232661 (Fax)

Sandro Trento

Bank of Italy

Via Nazionale 91
Research Department
00184 Roma
Italy

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