Why Do States Join Some Universal Treaties but not Others? An Analysis of Treaty Commitment Preferences

Forthcoming, Journal of Conflict Resolution

47 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2012 Last revised: 2 Oct 2014

See all articles by Yonatan Lupu

Yonatan Lupu

George Washington University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 22, 2014

Abstract

Preferences are crucial to the analysis of many key questions regarding international institutions. This paper analyzes the key predictors of states' preferences over international institutions. It does so by using a spatial-modeling approach that conceptualizes a treaty commitment preference space that includes agreements across multiple policy areas. I analyze the treaty commitment preference space in order to better understand the key dimensions of these preferences. I find that economics, and particularly trade, is the clearest and most consistent predictor of treaty commitment preferences, including with respect to many treaties in non-economic policy areas.

Keywords: International cooperation, treaties, ideal point estimation

Suggested Citation

Lupu, Yonatan, Why Do States Join Some Universal Treaties but not Others? An Analysis of Treaty Commitment Preferences (September 22, 2014). Forthcoming, Journal of Conflict Resolution. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2175755 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2175755

Yonatan Lupu (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Washington, DC 20052
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
147
Abstract Views
480
rank
198,700
PlumX Metrics