Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labor Income Taxation and Education Policy
20 Pages Posted: 22 May 2000
Date Written: December 1999
Abstract
Incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems. In the context of time consistent labor income taxation privacy can lead to a Pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy.
JEL Classification: H21, H23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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