McCleskey's Omission: The Racial Geography of Retribution
G. Ben Cohen
November 19, 2012
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2012
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the United States Supreme Court refrained from addressing the overwhelming evidence that race, and particularly the race of the victim, played a role in the administration of the death penalty. Twenty-five years later, with no corrective measures taken to ensure that the worst of the worst offenders receive the death penalty, the death penalty in America is as arbitrary as it ever was.
This article suggests that while both the majority and the dissent in McCleskey noted the history of racism in the South, neither confronted the manner in which racism was imbedded in the goal of retribution. A careful examination of death sentences in the modern era reflects that racism acrued at a county rather than a state level. The author suggests that the history of lynching, especially in the deep south, is inexorably connected to retribution.
Renewed focus on the value of retribution as a basis for imposing a death sentence is appropriate. The United States Supreme Court decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana, calls for further inquiry concerning the role of retribution in supporting the validity of the capital punishment. In Kennedy, the Court warned that “retribution” “most often can contradict the law’s own ends . . . When the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.”
Future challenges to the constitutionality of capital punishment should address the connection between race and retribution, the impact that desire for retribution has on county-level administration of the death penalty, and the validity of retribution as a basis for imposing the death penalty.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: McCleskey, Retribution, Racism, Capital Punishment
JEL Classification: K14, J71
Date posted: November 20, 2012 ; Last revised: January 19, 2013