Europeanization of EU Member-State Competition Policy: The Commission's Leadership Role

32 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2012

See all articles by Pedro Barros

Pedro Barros

New University of Lisbon

Joseph A. Clougherty

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Jo Seldeslachts

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB); German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Date Written: July 18, 2012

Abstract

The European Commission (EC) has long intended to play a leadership role in setting a pan-European competition policy; yet, both centralized and decentralized tendencies have been manifest in the European context for competition policy. It is not clear the whether these leadership intentions translate into actual leadership by the EC. We shed light on this issue by considering and estimating whether the EC’s leadership is both evident and robust. We present a framework that highlights the costs to Member States of diverging from EC merger policy norms. Employing cross-national panel data (covering 1994-2005) on European merger control, we find that changes in the EC’s proclivity to remedy mergers are reflected in Member States in subsequent years. Thus, the European Commission appears to play a leadership role in setting the tenor of merger policy throughout Europe.

Keywords: antitrust, competition, merger policy, leader-follower, institutions

JEL Classification: L40, K21

Suggested Citation

Barros, Pedro and Clougherty, Joseph A. and Seldeslachts, Jo, Europeanization of EU Member-State Competition Policy: The Commission's Leadership Role (July 18, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2177934 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2177934

Pedro Barros

New University of Lisbon ( email )

1099-085 Lisboa, 1099-085
Portugal

Joseph A. Clougherty

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1206 S. Sixth Street
330 Wohlers Hall, MC-706
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Jo Seldeslachts (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

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