Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2178363
 
 

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Corporate Governance and Pension Fund Performance


Oskar Kowalewski


IÉSEG School of Management; LEM - CNRS (UMR 9221)

March 29, 2012

Contemporary Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 14-44, 2012

Abstract:     
This study provides new evidence on the impact of governance on the performance of privately defined contribution pension plans. Using a hand collected data set on governance factors, the study shows that the external and internal governance mechanisms in pension plans are weak. One explanation for this weakness is the potential conflict between the pension beneficiaries and the fund’s owner, which depends on who bears the investment risk in the pension plan. Hence, different governance factors are found to be important for pension fund return on invested assets and also for its economic performance. Consequently, the overall policy conclusion is that more focus should be put on the governance of the pension funds, taking into account the different interests of the beneficiaries and owners as it may determine their performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: pension funds, corporate governance, agency theory, performance

JEL Classification: G23, G28, G30


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Date posted: November 21, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Kowalewski, Oskar, Corporate Governance and Pension Fund Performance (March 29, 2012). Contemporary Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 14-44, 2012 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2178363

Contact Information

Oskar Kowalewski (Contact Author)
IÉSEG School of Management ( email )
Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Defense
Paris La Defense, Paris 92044
France
HOME PAGE: http://www.ieseg.fr/en/faculty-and-research/professor/?id=1740
LEM - CNRS (UMR 9221) ( email )
Lille
France
HOME PAGE: http://lem.cnrs.fr/
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