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Corporate Governance and Pension Fund Performance

Contemporary Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 14-44, 2012

31 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2012  

Oskar Kowalewski

IÉSEG School of Management; LEM - CNRS (UMR 9221)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 29, 2012


This study provides new evidence on the impact of governance on the performance of privately defined contribution pension plans. Using a hand collected data set on governance factors, the study shows that the external and internal governance mechanisms in pension plans are weak. One explanation for this weakness is the potential conflict between the pension beneficiaries and the fund’s owner, which depends on who bears the investment risk in the pension plan. Hence, different governance factors are found to be important for pension fund return on invested assets and also for its economic performance. Consequently, the overall policy conclusion is that more focus should be put on the governance of the pension funds, taking into account the different interests of the beneficiaries and owners as it may determine their performance.

Keywords: pension funds, corporate governance, agency theory, performance

JEL Classification: G23, G28, G30

Suggested Citation

Kowalewski, Oskar, Corporate Governance and Pension Fund Performance (March 29, 2012). Contemporary Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 14-44, 2012 . Available at SSRN:

Oskar Kowalewski (Contact Author)

IÉSEG School of Management ( email )

1 Parvis de La Défense
Socle de la Grande Arche
Paris La Défense cedex, 92044


LEM - CNRS (UMR 9221) ( email )



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