The Case for Abolishing Sovereign Debtors’ Privileges

ZBB - Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft/ Journal of Banking Law and Banking (JBB) (Forthcoming)

29 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2012 Last revised: 4 Dec 2012

See all articles by Christian Kersting

Christian Kersting

Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf - Faculty of Law

Date Written: November 20, 2012

Abstract

Compared to private debtors, sovereign debtors, especially EU-sovereign debtors, enjoy many privileges under European Union law and under national laws. They are, for example, exempt from the prospectus requirement and not subject to the continuous disclosure obligations. The prohibition on market manipulation does not fully apply to states or their agents and the European Commission intends to expand this exemption even further. This article argues against these exemptions and makes the case for the abolition of sovereign debtors' privileges.

Keywords: Sovereign Debt Crisis, Financial Crisis, European Union, Sovereign Debtors, Disclosure, Market Manipulation, Privileges, Exemption, Exception

JEL Classification: G28, H6, K2

Suggested Citation

Kersting, Christian, The Case for Abolishing Sovereign Debtors’ Privileges (November 20, 2012). ZBB - Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft/ Journal of Banking Law and Banking (JBB) (Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2178422

Christian Kersting (Contact Author)

Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf - Faculty of Law ( email )

Universitätsstr. 1
Düsseldorf, D-40225
Germany
0211 8111660 (Phone)

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