Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations

18 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2012 Last revised: 20 Dec 2012

See all articles by Kai Hüschelrath

Kai Hüschelrath

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Ulrich Laitenberger

Telecom ParisTech; ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Florian Smuda

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission’s speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.

Keywords: Competition Policy, Empirical Analysis, Cartels, European Union, Fines, Leniency, Duration of Investigation

JEL Classification: L40, L41, K21

Suggested Citation

Hüschelrath, Kai and Laitenberger, Ulrich and Smuda, Florian, Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-071. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179037 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179037

Kai Hüschelrath (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Ulrich Laitenberger

Telecom ParisTech ( email )

46 rue Barrault
Paris, Cedex 13 75634
France

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Florian Smuda

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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