Download This PaperCartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations
18 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2012 Last revised: 20 Dec 2012
Date Written: 2012
Abstract
We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission’s speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.
Keywords: Competition Policy, Empirical Analysis, Cartels, European Union, Fines, Leniency, Duration of Investigation
JEL Classification: L40, L41, K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hüschelrath, Kai and Laitenberger, Ulrich and Smuda, Florian, Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-071, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179037 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179037
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