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https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179437
 
 

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Bribes and Firm Value


Stefan Zeume


University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

November 1, 2016

Ross School of Business Paper No. 1273

Abstract:     
I exploit the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 as a shock to U.K. firms’ cost of doing business. Around the Act’s passage, U.K. firms operating in high-corruption countries experience a drop in firm value, while their non-U.K. competitors in these countries encounter an increase. U.K. firms respond to the Act by reducing the expansion of their subsidiary network into perceptively corrupt countries. Moreover, their sales and merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in such countries declines. In sum, bribes facilitate doing business in certain countries. Imposing unilateral anti-bribery regulations on some firms benefits their unregulated competitors.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: valuation, corruption, regulation, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38, K22


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Date posted: November 23, 2012 ; Last revised: November 8, 2016

Suggested Citation

Zeume, Stefan, Bribes and Firm Value (November 1, 2016). Ross School of Business Paper No. 1273. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179437 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179437

Contact Information

Stefan Zeume (Contact Author)
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

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