Generosity and Political Preferences

47 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2012

See all articles by Christopher T. Dawes

Christopher T. Dawes

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science

Magnus Johannesson

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

Erik Lindqvist

Stockholm School of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Peter John Loewen

University of Toronto

Robert Ostling

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

Marianne Bonde

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Frida Priks

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: November 21, 2012

Abstract

We test whether generosity is related to political preferences and partisanship in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States using incentivized dictator games. The total sample consists of more than 5,000 respondents. We document that support for social spending and redistribution is positively correlated with generosity in all four countries. Further, we show that donors are more generous towards co-partisans in all countries, and that this effect is stronger among supporters of left-wing political parties. All results are robust to the inclusion to an extensive set of control variables, including income and education.

Keywords: Generosity, altruism, political preferences, size of government, public goods, dictator game, ingroup effect, political partisanship

JEL Classification: H11, H40

Suggested Citation

Dawes, Christopher T. and Johannesson, Magnus and Lindqvist, Erik and Loewen, Peter John and Ostling, Robert and Bonde, Marianne and Priks, Frida, Generosity and Political Preferences (November 21, 2012). IFN Working Paper No. 941. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179522 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179522

Christopher T. Dawes

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States

HOME PAGE: http://dss.ucsd.edu/~cdawes/

Magnus Johannesson

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden

Erik Lindqvist (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

PO Box 6501
Stockholm, 11383
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Stockholm, 102 15
Sweden

Peter John Loewen

University of Toronto ( email )

Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G8
Canada

Robert Ostling

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden

Marianne Bonde

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Frida Priks

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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