Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USA

61 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2012 Last revised: 8 Jan 2014

Tore Ellingsen

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Benedikt Herrmann

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Martin A. Nowak

Harvard University

David G. Rand

Yale University

Corina E. Tarnita

Princeton University - Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 1, 2013

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the nature of cooperation in various repeated games, with subjects from Romania and USA. We find stark cross-country differences in the propensity to sustain multilateral cooperation through bilateral rewards and punishments. U.S. groups perform well because sufficiently many cooperators are willing to discipline free riders. Romanian cooperators are less prone to jeopardize their productive bilateral relationships for the benefit of the group, collectively failing to provide adequate discipline. Our analysis indicates that the performance differences constitute a group-level phenomenon, being largely due to differences in shared beliefs rather than differences in individuals’ preferences.

Keywords: cooperation, culture, public goods game, reward, punishment, antisocial punishment, spite

JEL Classification: C70, C90, C91, C92, C93, D60, D64, D70, F00, H00, Z10

Suggested Citation

Ellingsen, Tore and Herrmann, Benedikt and Nowak, Martin A. and Rand, David G. and Tarnita, Corina E., Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USA (October 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179575 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179575

Tore Ellingsen

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9260 (Phone)
+46 8 31 3207 (Fax)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

Benedikt Herrmann

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

Martin A. Nowak

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

David G. Rand (Contact Author)

Yale University ( email )

New Haven, CT 06520
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.DaveRand.org

Corina E. Tarnita

Princeton University - Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
405
Rank
52,808
Abstract Views
1,798