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Toward an Economic Approach to Agency Agreements

Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 9, Issue 3, 553-591 (2013)

King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2013-5

40 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2012 Last revised: 4 Feb 2014

Angela Huyue Zhang

King's College London; The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law

Date Written: September 1, 2012

Abstract

It is a long-standing antitrust principle that agency relationships are exempt from price fixing violations. But the agency relationship must be "genuine." To discern genuine agency agreements, the prevailing approach adopted in both the United States and the EU focuses on whether the agent has incurred any specific risk or cost in relation to the distribution of the manufacturer's goods. Yet this approach has tended to obscure the economic nature of agency relationships. The real question to ask is not whether the agent has incurred any cost or risk, but instead whether in a given case an agency model, rather than a distribution model, actually constitutes a more efficient form for organizing distribution functions between the contracting parties. In fact, over a quarter of a century ago, Judge Posner proposed a business justification approach for analyzing agency agreements in Morrison v. Murray Biscuit. Building on Morrison and on the economic literature of property rights and agency problems, this article explores the fundamental question of how parties choose to enter into an optimal contractual form and, moreover, proposes an economic approach to discern genuine agency agreements. It also calls for revision of the current EU Vertical Guidelines on agency agreements, which are so stringent that they deter businesses unnecessarily from entering into agency arrangements.

Keywords: genuine agency, resale price maintenance, contract design, e-book, travel industry

JEL Classification: K21, K0, L1, L2, L4, O31

Suggested Citation

Zhang, Angela Huyue, Toward an Economic Approach to Agency Agreements (September 1, 2012). Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 9, Issue 3, 553-591 (2013); King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2013-5. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2179673 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179673

Angela Huyue Zhang (Contact Author)

King's College London ( email )

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/people/academic/azhang.aspx

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
China

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