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Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange: Tuition and Worker Exchanges

Umut Mert Dur

North Carolina State University

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College - Department of Economics

March 9, 2015

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show that stable equilibria discourage net-exporting firms from exchange. We introduce the two-sided top-trading-cycles mechanism that is balanced-efficient, worker-strategy-proof, acceptable, and individually rational, and respects priority bylaws regarding worker eligibility. We prove that it is the unique mechanism fulfilling these objectives. Moreover, it encourages exchange, since full participation is the dominant strategy for firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Market Design, Matching Theory, Tuition Exchange, Worker Exchange, Balanced Exchange, Two–sided Matching, Two–sided Top Trading Cycles

JEL Classification: C71, C78, D71, D78

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Date posted: November 25, 2012 ; Last revised: March 10, 2015

Suggested Citation

Dur, Umut Mert and Ünver, M. Utku, Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange: Tuition and Worker Exchanges (March 9, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2180357 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2180357

Contact Information

Umut Mert Dur (Contact Author)
North Carolina State University ( email )
Hillsborough Street
Raleigh, NC 27695
United States
Utku Unver
Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )
140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
+1 (617) 552 2217 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver
Feedback to SSRN

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