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Formal Leadership in Multilateral Negotiations: A Rational Institutionalist Theory

The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 1 (2): 117-141, 2006

25 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2012  

Jonas Tallberg

Stockholm University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

The exercise of leadership by the chairs of multilateral negotiations so far has received limited systematic attention in scholarship on international cooperation. This article addresses this gap by presenting a rational institutionalist theory of formal leadership that provides answers to three central questions: Why do states delegate powers of process control to the chairmanship of international negotiations? What are the power resources of formal leaders? When, why, and how do negotiation chairs wield influence over the outcomes of multilateral bargaining? The theory suggests that chairmanships are empowered to fulfill functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation in international bargaining; identifies procedural control and privileged information as essential power resources of negotiation chairs; and isolates the conditions under which formal leaders shape the efficiency and distributional implications of multilateral bargaining. The article ends by outlining an alternative theoretical approach to formal leadership, drawn from sociological institutionalism.

Keywords: leadership, chairmanship, leader, chair, bargaining, negotiation, diplomacy, rational choice institutionalism

Suggested Citation

Tallberg, Jonas, Formal Leadership in Multilateral Negotiations: A Rational Institutionalist Theory (2006). The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 1 (2): 117-141, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2180558

Jonas Tallberg (Contact Author)

Stockholm University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

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