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The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency, and Distribution in EU Negotiations

Journal of Common Market Studies 42 (5): 999-1022, 2004

24 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2012  

Jonas Tallberg

Stockholm University - Department of Political Science

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

Decision-making in the European Union is subject to the risk of negotiation failure. At the start of negotiations, EU governments tend to be secretive about their true preferences and adopt tactical negotiating positions that reduce or eliminate the contract zone that is necessary to realize joint benefits. This article argues that the EU Presidency can play a crucial role in unlocking incompatible negotiating positions and securing agreement, thus preventing negotiation failure from materializing. Drawing on general bargaining theory and rational choice institutionalism, it presents a theory of the demand for, and supply of, brokerage by the chair. The explanatory power of this theory is demonstrated through two case studies: Germany’s chairing of the Agenda 2000 negotiations, and France’s chairing of the IGC 2000 negotiations.

Keywords: European Union, negotiations, bargaining, brokerage, Presidency, chairmanship, influence, Agenda 2000, IGC 2000

Suggested Citation

Tallberg, Jonas, The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency, and Distribution in EU Negotiations (2004). Journal of Common Market Studies 42 (5): 999-1022, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2180560

Jonas Tallberg (Contact Author)

Stockholm University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

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