Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History

31 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2012 Last revised: 23 Jan 2013

See all articles by Petra Moser

Petra Moser

NYU Stern Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 10, 2012

Abstract

What is the optimal system of intellectual property rights to encourage innovation? Empirical evidence from economic history can help to inform important policy questions that have been difficult to answer with modern data: 1) Does the existence of strong patent laws encourage innovation? And 2) May patent laws influence the direction – as opposed to the rate – of technical change? Economic history can also help to shed light on the effectiveness of policy tools that are intended to address problems with the current patent system: 3) How do patent pools, as a mechanism to mitigate litigation risks, influence the creation of new technologies? 4) Will compulsory licensing, as a mechanism to improve access to essential innovations in developing countries, discourage innovation in the developing countries? This essay summarizes results of existing research and highlights promising areas for future research.

Keywords: patent laws, innovation, economic history, pools, compulsory licensing

JEL Classification: O3, O34, N00, Q16, K21, L4

Suggested Citation

Moser, Petra, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History (December 10, 2012). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 437. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2180847 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2180847

Petra Moser (Contact Author)

NYU Stern Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10003
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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