An Impossibility Result for Virtual Implementation with Status Quo

10 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2013

See all articles by Georgy Artemov

Georgy Artemov

University of Melbourne - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 1, 2013

Abstract

In this paper, virtual implementation is restricted so that only a socially optimal outcome or some fixed outcome (a status quo) can be delivered on the equilibrium path. Under such a restriction, any unanimous and implementable social choice function is almost-dictatorial. That is, there is an agent who obtains the most preferable outcome as long as this outcome is better than status quo outcome for all agents. If the range of social choice functions is restricted to pure outcomes only, the result extends to outcomes that are worse than the status quo.

Keywords: Virtual implementation, social choice rules, dictatorial rules

JEL Classification: D78, D71, C72

Suggested Citation

Artemov, Georgy, An Impossibility Result for Virtual Implementation with Status Quo (January 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2181132 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2181132

Georgy Artemov (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Department of Economics ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia

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