CDS Pricing Under Basel III: Capital Relief and Default Protection

Risk (shortened version appeared October 2013)

16 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2012 Last revised: 13 Aug 2014

See all articles by Chris Kenyon

Chris Kenyon

MUFG Securities EMEA plc; University College London

Andrew David Green

Scotiabank

Date Written: November 23, 2012

Abstract

Basel III introduces new capital charges for CVA. These charges, and the Basel 2.5 default capital charge can be mitigated by CDS. Therefore, to price in the capital relief that CDS contracts provide, we introduce a CDS pricing model with three legs: premium; default protection; and capital relief. If markets are complete, with no CDS bond basis, then CDSs can be replicated by taking short positions in risky floating bonds issued by the reference entity and a riskless bank account. If these conditions do not hold, then it is theoretically possible that the capital relief that CDSs provide may be priced in. Thus our model provides bounds on the CDS-implied hazard rates when markets are incomplete. Under simple assumptions we show that 20% to over 50% of observed CDS spread could be due to priced in capital relief. Given that this is different for IMM and non-IMM banks will we see differential pricing?

Keywords: CDS, Basel III, capital, capital relief, incomplete markets, IMM, CEM, regulations, hazard rates, CVA

JEL Classification: G13, G18, G11, G12, D52

Suggested Citation

Kenyon, Chris and Green, Andrew David, CDS Pricing Under Basel III: Capital Relief and Default Protection (November 23, 2012). Risk (shortened version appeared October 2013), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2181289 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2181289

Chris Kenyon (Contact Author)

MUFG Securities EMEA plc ( email )

25 Ropemaker St
London, EC2Y 9AJ
United Kingdom

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Andrew David Green

Scotiabank ( email )

201 Bishopsgate
London, London EC2M 3NS
United Kingdom

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