Agency Problems in Venture Capital Contracts: Islamic Profit Sharing Ratio as a Screening Device

33 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2012

See all articles by Kaouther Jouaber-Snoussi

Kaouther Jouaber-Snoussi

Université Paris Dauphine

Meryem Mehri

Université Paris Dauphine

Date Written: November 27, 2012

Abstract

Both Islamic and classical venture contracts suffer from information asymmetry and incentive problems. Venture capitalist and Entrepreneur have an agency relationship because of the insufficient information about the funded project and/or the entrepreneur type. Referring to the literature, this paper presents a theory of Profit Sharing Ratio (PSR) for PLS contracts with adverse selection about the entrepreneur type. In order to avoid the agency problem, this paper proposes a theoretical framework in which the negotiated profit sharing ratio (PSR) acts as a screening device. We show that agency problems are signaled when the entrepreneur accepts a PSR set beyond a given threshold. This critical value of the PSR corresponds to the maximum payoff to the venture capitalist. We suggest that the optimal PSR level may complete the carried interest in classical venture contracts and offers a new tool for screening entrepreneurs’ type.

Keywords: venture capital contracts, agency problems, profit sharing ratio, carried interest

JEL Classification: D82, G21, G23, G24

Suggested Citation

Jouaber-Snoussi, Kaouther and Mehri, Meryem, Agency Problems in Venture Capital Contracts: Islamic Profit Sharing Ratio as a Screening Device (November 27, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2181416 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2181416

Kaouther Jouaber-Snoussi (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

France

Meryem Mehri

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

DRM-Finance, Paris-Dauphine University Place du Ma
Paris
France

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