An Economic Analysis of Judicial Careers

Posted: 30 Nov 2012

See all articles by Paolo Polidori

Paolo Polidori

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Désirée Teobaldelli

University of Urbino

Davide Ticchi

Polytechnic University of Marche; affiliation not provided to SSRN; Department of Economics and Social Sciences

Date Written: December 1, 2012

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze from an economic perspective the effects of the judicial careers arrangement on the trials' outcome. The institutional organization of judicial careers follows two distinct ideal systems. One is characterized by the fact that public prosecutor and judge belong to the same professional body, as magistrates, while the other one is characterized by the separation of the judiciary from prosecutors. We model this feature of the judicial system as a continuum variable and explain why this choice can be appropriate. We obtain that a more unified system of judicial careers leads to fewer distortions in the process preceding the trial, while it introduces more distortions during the trial. We find the optimal degree of separation of judicial careers and provide some comparative statics results.

Keywords: judicial careers, legal system

JEL Classification: K00, K40

Suggested Citation

Polidori, Paolo and Teobaldelli, Désirée and Ticchi, Davide, An Economic Analysis of Judicial Careers (December 1, 2012). Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, Vol. 3, December 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2182493

Paolo Polidori (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Désirée Teobaldelli

University of Urbino ( email )

Via Saffi 2
Urbino, Pesaro-Urbino 61029
Italy

Davide Ticchi

Polytechnic University of Marche ( email )

Piazzale Martelli 8
Ancona, 60121
Italy

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Department of Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Piazzale Martelli 8
Ancona, 60121
Italy

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