Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Export Dynamics: Theory and Evidence from French Firms
67 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2012
Date Written: October 26, 2012
Using French firm-level trade data, we provide empirical support for a heterogeneous firm model in which exporting requires finding a local partner in each market: contracts are incomplete, exporters must learn the reliability of their partners through experience, and export behaviour is state-dependent due to matching frictions. As predicted by our theoretical model, we find that better legal institutions ease contracting frictions especially in sectors with serious contracting problems. This increases state dependence by more in those sectors. Finally, hazard rates depend on the quality of local legal institutions and decline with the age of the relationship, as unreliable partners are weeded out.
Keywords: trade dynamics, learning, institutions, state dependence, firm-level trade data
JEL Classification: F12, F14, L14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation