Ambiguous Solicitation: Ambiguous Prescription

10 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2012

See all articles by Robert S. Gazzale

Robert S. Gazzale

University of Toronto - Department of Economics; Williams College - Department of Economics

Julian C. Jamison

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics; World Bank eMBeD (Mind, Behavior, and Development); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL); Innovations for Poverty Action

Alexander Karlan

Williams College - Department of Economics

Dean S. Karlan

Yale University; Innovations for Poverty Action; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: January 2013

Abstract

We conduct a two‐phase laboratory experiment, separated by several weeks. In the first phase, we conduct urn games intended to measure ambiguity aversion on a representative population of undergraduate students. In the second phase, we invite the students back with four different solicitation treatments, varying in the ambiguity of information regarding the task and the payout of the laboratory experiment. We find that those who return do not differ from the overall pool with respect to their ambiguity aversion. However, no solicitation treatment generates a representative sample. The ambiguous task treatment drives away the ambiguity averse disproportionally and the detailed task treatment draws in the ambiguity averse disproportionally. Finally, the standard laboratory recruitment e‐mail disproportionately draws in those who are not ambiguity averse.

JEL Classification: A12, C81, C90

Suggested Citation

Gazzale, Robert S. and Jamison, Julian C. and Karlan, Alexander and Karlan, Dean S., Ambiguous Solicitation: Ambiguous Prescription (January 2013). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 51, Issue 1, pp. 1002-1011, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2182967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00383.x

Robert S. Gazzale

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

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Williams College - Department of Economics ( email )

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Julian C. Jamison

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

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Exeter, EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom

World Bank eMBeD (Mind, Behavior, and Development) ( email )

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) ( email )

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Innovations for Poverty Action ( email )

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Alexander Karlan

Williams College - Department of Economics ( email )

Fernald House
Williamstown, MA 01267
United States

Dean S. Karlan

Yale University ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
United States

Innovations for Poverty Action ( email )

1731 Connecticut Ave, 4th floor
New Haven, CT 20009
United States

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) ( email )

E60-246
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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United Kingdom

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