Do States Free Ride in Antitrust Enforcement?

5 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2012

See all articles by Robert M. Feinberg

Robert M. Feinberg

American University - Department of Economics

Thomas A. Husted

American University - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 2013

Abstract

Recent research has documented a substantial role in antitrust enforcement by U.S. states. While many of the cases litigated involve small local firms, a nontrivial portion encompasses multiple‐state issues. Some previous literature has investigated whether states engage in free‐riding behavior in environmental regulation, and whether governments free ride on private decisions in provision of public goods. In this paper, we analyze a sample of antitrust cases involving cross‐state impacts (from the Multi‐State Antitrust Database, provided by the National Association of Attorneys General) and explain the determinants of free riding (which we define as participating in a case, but not as a lead plaintiff).

JEL Classification: L40, H41, H77

Suggested Citation

Feinberg, Robert M. and Husted, Thomas A., Do States Free Ride in Antitrust Enforcement? (January 2013). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 51, Issue 1, pp. 997-1001, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2183012 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00477.x

Robert M. Feinberg

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Thomas A. Husted

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States

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