Can Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums Control Moral Hazard?

14 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2012

See all articles by Edward S. Prescott

Edward S. Prescott

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Date Written: 2002

Abstract

It is commonly thought that risk-based deposit insurance premiums can control the moral hazard inherent in deposit insurance. That view is wrong; other devices — such as state-contingent payments and supervisory exams — are needed as well.

Suggested Citation

Prescott, Edward (Ned) Simpson, Can Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums Control Moral Hazard? (2002). FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly, vol. 88, no. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 87-100. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2183333

Edward (Ned) Simpson Prescott (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland ( email )

P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.clevelandfed.org/people-search?pid=f8ca941e-4b51-41f6-95f8-c87f1d3806e5

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