Voter Perceptions and Incumbent Vote Loss

31 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2012

See all articles by David Fortunato

David Fortunato

University of California, Merced - School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts

Date Written: October 31, 2012

Abstract

One of the most pervasive empirical regularities in advanced industrial democracies is that incumbent governments tend to lose votes. Despite widespread acknowledgment of this so-called “cost of ruling” and its normative significance, political scientists possess little understanding of this phenomenon in parliamentary democracies where coalition governance is the norm. Here, I present a micro-level explanation for incumbent vote loss. In sum, voters expect the parties they support to fight for certain policies, but the compromise and cooperation necessary for coalition governance prevent cabinet parties from meeting the expectations of their supporters. I argue that cabinet parties are more likely to lose voters when the perception of cooperation is high. To support my claims, I present experimental evidence that shows voters react poorly to coalition compromise and evidence from seven panel surveys administered in five coalitional democracies suggesting that the perception of compromise significantly reduces the probability of supporting the incumbent.

Suggested Citation

Fortunato, David, Voter Perceptions and Incumbent Vote Loss (October 31, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2184031 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2184031

David Fortunato (Contact Author)

University of California, Merced - School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts ( email )

P.O. Box 2039
Merced, CA 95344
United States

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