Judging EU Secrecy

Cahiers de Droit Européen 2012/2

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-103

Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Research Paper No. 2012-07

37 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2012 Last revised: 12 Dec 2017

See all articles by Deirdre Curtin

Deirdre Curtin

Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance; European University Institute, Department of Law, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Date Written: December 3, 2012

Abstract

The overall interaction between the political and the legal systems of the EU has been obscured in recent years. One area where this has happened is that of ‘transparency.’ By selecting a number of recent cases about the interpretation of the access to documents regulations, this article highlights how meta rules on rules can reveal structural fault-lines that are absolutely crucial to understanding how the European Union is developing as a matter of practice. The fault-lines thus revealed all boil down to EU supranational institutions in one form or another struggling to maintain an internal ‘space’, to think, to negotiate, to deliberate, as the case may be, in all serenity and without being disturbed by the broader ‘public’. The cases discussed in this paper also reveal what can be described as a process based and essentially discretionary rationale for secrecy as opposed to a necessity based policy rationale for secrecy. Finally, some wider conclusions are drawn on the relationship between supranational power and legal accountability forums in Luxembourg.

Keywords: Transparency, supranational, fault, lines, process rationale, discretionary rationale, secrecy

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Curtin, Deirdre M. and Curtin, Deirdre M., Judging EU Secrecy (December 3, 2012). Cahiers de Droit Européen 2012/2, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-103, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Research Paper No. 2012-07, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2184249 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2184249

Deirdre M. Curtin (Contact Author)

European University Institute, Department of Law, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/Law/People/Professors/Curtin.aspx

Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance ( email )

P.O.Box 1030
Amsterdam, 1000 BA
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/d.m.curtin/

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