The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation

42 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2012

See all articles by Gil S. Epstein

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Yosef Mealem

Netanya Academic College

Shmuel Nitzan

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 30, 2012

Abstract

This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of unenforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups’ objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under unenforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under unenforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under unenforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.

Keywords: policy formation, political parties, ideological predispositions, electoral power, post-elections lobbying, enforced party discipline

JEL Classification: D700, D720, D740, D780

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Gil S. and Mealem, Yosef and Nitzan, Shmuel, The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation (November 30, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2184710

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 531 8937 (Phone)
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~epsteig/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

Drayton House
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

Yosef Mealem

Netanya Academic College

1 University St
Netanya 42100, 4223587
Israel

Shmuel Nitzan (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972.3.531.8930 (Phone)
+972.3.535.3180 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
20
Abstract Views
368
PlumX Metrics