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Auditing and Bank Capital Regulation

17 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2012  

Edward S. Prescott

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

Deterministic and stochastic auditing is introduced into a model of bank capital regulation. Low-capital banks are audited the most. Safe banks hold less capital than risky banks, so, counterintuitively, safe banks are audited more intensively than risky banks. The importance of auditing by regulators and penalties for noncompliance are discussed in light of the Basel II capital regulation proposals. Emphasis is placed on the importance of supervisory review — Pillar Two of Basel II — of the accuracy of banks' reports on the risk of their assets.

Suggested Citation

Prescott, Edward S., Auditing and Bank Capital Regulation (2004). FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly, vol. 90, no. 4, Fall 2004, pp. 47-63. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2184962

Edward (Ned) Prescott (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland ( email )

P.O. Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.clevelandfed.org/people-search?pid=f8ca941e-4b51-41f6-95f8-c87f1d3806e5

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