CEO Stock Option Contracts: UK Evidence

Posted: 30 Aug 2000

See all articles by Martin J. Conyon

Martin J. Conyon

Bentley University; Wharton School, Center for Human Resources


In this paper we examine CEO stock option contracts using UK data for fiscal year 1997. We show how the portfolio of options varies with firm wealth; describe the structure of the contract (in terms of vesting criteria related to performance targets), and illustrate whether the option performance criteria is historically 'demanding.' Finally, we show how the pay performance term varies with the structure of the option contract. Our new evidence shows the complex structure of UK option contracts for CEOs.

JEL Classification: J31, J44

Suggested Citation

Conyon, Martin J., CEO Stock Option Contracts: UK Evidence. Available at SSRN:

Martin J. Conyon (Contact Author)

Bentley University ( email )

175 Forest Street
Waltham, MA 02145
United States

Wharton School, Center for Human Resources ( email )

3600 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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