Logics of Action and Models of Capitalism: Explaining Bottom-Up Non-Liberal Change

29 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2012 Last revised: 16 Jan 2013

See all articles by Julien Etienne

Julien Etienne

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Gerhard Schnyder

Loughborough University London - Institute for International Management; University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research; King's College London

Date Written: December 5, 2012

Abstract

Recent institutionalist scholarship has established links between the liberalization or “disorganization” of capitalism and shifts in economic actors’ “logic of action” towards opportunism. Yet, a more general theoretical treatment of “logics of actions” and their links to specific institutional contexts is lacking. This paper proposes to link a theory distinguishing three “logics of action” – opportunism, enlightened self-interest and strong solidarity – to Höpner’s typology of capitalist institutions – organized, coordinated, and liberal. It theorizes the interactions between these logics and the social mechanism – goal signaling – that can explain a shift from one logic of action to another, potentially leading to change from one type of institution to another. An empirical example shows that such a theory furthers our understanding of the micro-foundations not just of liberalization, but also of the contrary evolution, i.e. the (re-)embedding of capitalism.

Keywords: banking sector, institutional change, actor-centered institutionalism, political economy, logics of action

JEL Classification: P16

Suggested Citation

Etienne, Julien and Schnyder, Gerhard, Logics of Action and Models of Capitalism: Explaining Bottom-Up Non-Liberal Change (December 5, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2185368 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185368

Julien Etienne (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Gerhard Schnyder

Loughborough University London - Institute for International Management ( email )

Lesney Avenue
Here East
London, E15 2GZ
Great Britain
+44 (0)20 3805 1360 (Phone)

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research ( email )

Judge Business School Building
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
++44 (0)1223 765325 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/people/research-associates/gerhard-schnyder/

King's College London ( email )

150 Stamford Street
London, SE1 9NN
United Kingdom
++44 (0)20 7848 4633 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/mgmt/people/academic/schnyder/

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