Do Exclusionary Rules Convict the Innocent?

Forthcoming in Matthew Baker and Thomas Miceli (eds.) "Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law," Edward Elgar Publishing

Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 13-30

Posted: 6 Dec 2012 Last revised: 16 Jan 2013

See all articles by Dhammika Dharmapala

Dhammika Dharmapala

UC Berkeley School of Law; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Richard H. McAdams

University of Chicago Law School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 5, 2012

Abstract

Rules excluding various kinds of evidence from criminal trials play a prominent role in criminal procedure and have generated considerable controversy. In this paper we address the general topic of excluding factually relevant evidence, that is, the kind of evidence that would rationally influence the jury’s verdict if it were admitted. We do not offer a comprehensive analysis of these exclusionary rules but add to the existing literature by identifying a new domain for economic analysis, focusing on how juries respond to the existence of such a rule. We show that the impact of exclusionary rules on the likelihood of conviction is complex and depends on the degree of rationality exhibited by juries and on the motivations of the prosecutor.

Keywords: exclusionary rules, evidence, juries

JEL Classification: K40

Suggested Citation

Dharmapala, Dhammika and Garoupa, Nuno and McAdams, Richard H., Do Exclusionary Rules Convict the Innocent? (December 5, 2012). Forthcoming in Matthew Baker and Thomas Miceli (eds.) "Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law," Edward Elgar Publishing, Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 13-30, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2185719

Dhammika Dharmapala (Contact Author)

UC Berkeley School of Law ( email )

302 JSP
2240 Piedmont Ave
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Richard H. McAdams

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-2520 (Phone)

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