Control Institucional Dominante Y Capacidad Informativa De Los Resultados Contables (Dominant Institutional Control and Earnings Informativeness)
Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad (Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting) (Forthcoming)
39 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2012
Date Written: December 6, 2012
Abstract
En el trabajo analizamos la relación entre el control institucional dominante y la capacidad informativa de los resultados contables en una muestra de empresas no financieras cotizadas españolas en el periodo 1996-2009. Nuestros resultados revelan que a medida que aumenta la propiedad más allá del nivel requerido para el control efectivo en manos del banco dominante, mayor es la credibilidad otorgada por el mercado a la información contable divulgada, mientras que a medida que aumenta la propiedad del fondo de inversión dominante, el mercado espera que la información contable se erija en un instrumento a disposición de dicho accionista para la consecución de mayores primas de control, más que en un reflejo fiel de las operaciones realizadas por la empresa. Estos resultados vienen explicados por las diferencias en objetivos, estabilidad, nivel de escrutinio y visibilidad que caracterizan la actuación de ambos tipos de inversores institucionales cuando detentan el control efectivo de la empresa.
In this paper we analyze the relation between dominant institutional control and earnings informativeness in a sample of non-financial Spanish firms listed on the electronic market over the 1996 to 2009 period. Our results suggest that, when a bank is the firm’s dominant owner, increasing his ownership stake beyond the minimum level needed for effective control provides an alignment of interest between the bank and the minority shareholders, what positively affects earnings informativeness. Nevertheless, when the dominant owner is an investment fund, increasing his ownership stake beyond the minimum level needed for effective control reveals the investment fund's desire to obtain greater control premiums when he leaves the firm, what negatively affects earnings informativeness. Our results are consistent with differences in objectives, stability, scrutiny and visibility of both banks and investment funds when they own the effective control of the firm.
Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.
Keywords: dominant shareholder, bank, investment fund, earnings informativeness, stability
JEL Classification: M41, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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