Employer's Information and Promotion-Seeking Activities

19 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2012

See all articles by Gil S. Epstein

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Abstract

This paper presents a model in which promotion of employees within the internal firm hierarchy is determined by the individuals' allocation of time between promotion/rent-seeking and productive activity. We consider the effect of an increase in the employer's knowledge (information) regarding the employees' productivity levels on the total time spent by the workers in non-productive promotion-seeking activities.

Keywords: promotion-seeking activities, contest, knowledge

JEL Classification: D2, D72, J2

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Gil S., Employer's Information and Promotion-Seeking Activities. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7023. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2186801

Gil S. Epstein (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~epsteig/

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University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

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