Evolutionary Determinants of War

23 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2012 Last revised: 20 Apr 2013

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Florian Morath

Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck; Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: April 18, 2013

Abstract

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent confl‡ict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically con…fined area, we use Schaffer'’s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We …find that players' ’evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent con‡flict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in …fighting strength are re‡flected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.

Keywords: conflict, contest, endogenous fighting, balance of power, evolutionary stability

JEL Classification: D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Morath, Florian, Evolutionary Determinants of War (April 18, 2013). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2012-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2187218 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2187218

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Florian Morath

Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck ( email )

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

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