Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2187771
 
 

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Delays in Leniency Application: Is there Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?


Jun Zhou


Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Dennis L. Gärtner


University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics

December 11, 2012

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-044

Abstract:     
This paper studies cartels’ strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests find that delays are symmetrically affected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic fluctuations. Our results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: corporate leniency program, cartel, leniency application delays

JEL Classification: D43, K21, K42, L13


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Date posted: December 13, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Zhou, Jun and Gärtner, Dennis L., Delays in Leniency Application: Is there Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door? (December 11, 2012). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-044. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2187771 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2187771

Contact Information

Jun Zhou
Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University ( email )
Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Dennis L. Gärtner (Contact Author)
University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics ( email )
Postfach 2220
D-53012 Bonn
Germany
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