Delays in Leniency Application: Is there Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?

30 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2012

See all articles by Jun Zhou

Jun Zhou

Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Dennis L. Gärtner

University of St. Gallen

Date Written: December 11, 2012

Abstract

This paper studies cartels’ strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests find that delays are symmetrically affected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic fluctuations. Our results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.

Keywords: corporate leniency program, cartel, leniency application delays

JEL Classification: D43, K21, K42, L13

Suggested Citation

Zhou, Jun and Gärtner, Dennis L., Delays in Leniency Application: Is there Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door? (December 11, 2012). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-044. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2187771 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2187771

Jun Zhou

Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University ( email )

Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Dennis L. Gärtner (Contact Author)

University of St. Gallen ( email )

Bodanstrasse 6
St Gallen, 9000
Switzerland

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