Internal Contradictions of Judicial Mediation in China

53 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2012

See all articles by Xin He

Xin He

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK); University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Law, Visiting

Kwai Hang Ng

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Date Written: December 11, 2012

Abstract

Judicial mediation in China represents an extreme case of integration between adjudication and mediation. Based on ethnographic work and extensive interviews, this article studies how judicial mediation actually works in China. It finds that the incorporation of mediation as part of the official trial process creates a set of internal contradictions. In addition to the inherent role conflict of a judge acting also as a mediator, adjudication and mediation stages are organized by different principles. When the rather rigid format of adjudication is carried over to in-trial mediation, it curtails the flexible, non-legalistic approach that mediation is meant to promote. Challenged authority, uncontrolled process, narrowed issues, and weakened norms all make a settled outcome difficult to achieve. In comparison with judicial mediation in other jurisdictions, this case study from China bears important theoretical implications on the limit of informal justice.

Keywords: Judicial mediation, China

Suggested Citation

He, Xin and Ng, Kwai Hang, Internal Contradictions of Judicial Mediation in China (December 11, 2012). Law and Social Inquiry, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2187880

Xin He (Contact Author)

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Law, Visiting

504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Kwai Hang Ng

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
359
Abstract Views
1,481
rank
81,382
PlumX Metrics