Publicity vs. Impact in Nonprofit Disclosures and Donor Preferences: A Sequential Game with One Nonprofit Organization and N Donors

20 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2012 Last revised: 5 Mar 2015

See all articles by Jun Zhuang

Jun Zhuang

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering

Gregory D. Saxton

Schulich School of Business, York University

Han Wu

Independent

Date Written: August 9, 2011

Abstract

Charitable giving is one of the essential tasks of a properly functioning civil society. This task is greatly complicated by the lack of organizational transparency and by the information asymmetries that often exist between organizations and donors in the market for charitable donations. The disclosure of financial, performance, donor-relations, and fundraising-related data is thus an important tool for nonprofit organizations attempting to attract greater donations while boosting accountability and public trust. There are, however, varying payoffs associated with such disclosure depending on the nature of donor preferences and the relative openness and effectiveness of competing organizations. To help understand the interplay between nonprofit organizational disclosures and individual donations, we present a novel game-theoretic model of disclosure – donation interactions that incorporates the predominant forms of both donor preferences and “value-relevant” information.

Keywords: voluntary disclosure, nonprofit organizations, donations, charitable giving, game theory, organizational communication, strategic communication

JEL Classification: C70, D80, D82, L31

Suggested Citation

Zhuang, Jun and Saxton, Gregory D. and Wu, Han, Publicity vs. Impact in Nonprofit Disclosures and Donor Preferences: A Sequential Game with One Nonprofit Organization and N Donors (August 9, 2011). Annals of Operation Research, vol. 221, pp. 469-491, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2187932

Jun Zhuang

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering ( email )

342 Bell Hall
Buffalo, NY 14260-2050
United States

Gregory D. Saxton (Contact Author)

Schulich School of Business, York University ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://social-metrics.org

Han Wu

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

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