For a Rigorous 'Effects Based' Analysis of Vertical Restraints Adopted by Dominant Firms: An Analysis of the EU and Brazilian Competition Laws: Comment

23 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2012  

Seth B. Sacher

Federal Trade Commission

Date Written: December 12, 2012

Abstract

In a recent working paper, Damien Geradin & Caio Marioda Silva Pereira Neto argue that the Brazilian competition system would greatly benefit from the adoption of guidelines like the European Commission Guidance Paper, which offers a legal and economic methodology to implement an “effects-based approach” to vertical restraints adopted by a dominant firm. This paper notes that while their proposed effects based analysis is far superior to per se treatment of vertical restraints, this framework can be further improved by careful attention to the challenges raised by the so-called “Chicago School” regarding the impact of vertical restraints. Further, whether it would be advisable for Brazil to write formal guidances regarding its policy toward vertical restraints should be evaluated in light of both the nature of Brazilian competition laws and the flexibility of the Brazilian economy.

Keywords: competition law, antitrust, Brazil, vertical restraints, abuse of dominance, unilateral conduct, tying, rebates, exclusive dealing, enforcement

JEL Classification: K21, K40, L10, L42

Suggested Citation

Sacher, Seth B., For a Rigorous 'Effects Based' Analysis of Vertical Restraints Adopted by Dominant Firms: An Analysis of the EU and Brazilian Competition Laws: Comment (December 12, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2188379 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2188379

Seth B. Sacher (Contact Author)

Federal Trade Commission ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

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