Inferring Strategic Voting

50 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2012

See all articles by Kei Kawai

Kei Kawai

University of California at Berkeley

Yasutora Watanabe

University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Economics

Date Written: April 11, 2012

Abstract

We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction [63.4%, 84.9%] of strategic voters, only a small fraction [1.4%, 4.2%] of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies.

Keywords: strategic voting, set estimation, partially identified models, election

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Kawai, Kei and Watanabe, Yasutora, Inferring Strategic Voting (April 11, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2188562 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2188562

Kei Kawai (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Yasutora Watanabe

University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

Tokyo
Japan

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