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Trust and Reciprocity Drive Social Common Goods Contribution Norms

Proceedings of the Cambridge Business and Economics Conference 2015; Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, 2016

48 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2012 Last revised: 22 Feb 2017

Julia M. Puaschunder

Harvard University; The New School for Social Research; Columbia University

Date Written: December 12, 2012

Abstract

In the emergent field of tax psychology, the focus on regulating tax evasion recently shifted towards searching for situational cues that elicit common goals compliance. Trust and reciprocity are argued to steer a socially-favorable environment that supports social tax ethics norms. Experiments, in which 256 participants played an economic trust game followed by a common goods game, found evidence for trust and reciprocity leading to individuals contributing to common goals. The more trust and reciprocity was practiced and experienced, the more common goals were supported – leveraging trust and reciprocity as interesting tax compliance antecedents. The results have widespread implications for governmental-citizen relations. Policy makers and public servants are advised to establish a service-oriented customer atmosphere with citizens breeding trust and reciprocity in order to reach common societal goals.

Keywords: Common goods game, Common goals compliance, Reciprocity, Tax ethics, Trust, Trust game, Tax Psychology

Suggested Citation

Puaschunder, Julia M., Trust and Reciprocity Drive Social Common Goods Contribution Norms (December 12, 2012). Proceedings of the Cambridge Business and Economics Conference 2015; Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2188638 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2188638

Julia M. Puaschunder (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

24 Oxford Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

The New School for Social Research ( email )

6 East 16th Street
New York, NY 10003
United States

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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