Attendance of Board Meetings and Company Performance: Evidence from Taiwan

42 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2012

See all articles by Hsin-I Chou

Hsin-I Chou

RMIT University; University of Otago - Department of Accountancy and Finance

Huimin Chung

National Chiao-Tung University - Graduate Institute of Finance

Xiangkang Yin

Deakin University; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Date Written: October 10, 2012

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates board meeting attendance and its effects on profit performance of Taiwanese listed corporations. High meeting attendance by directors themselves can enhance a firm’s profitability but higher attendance by their representatives has an adverse effect. Independence of directors or a board is also positively associated with firm performance. These results largely hold even when the sample is decomposed to count for different ownership structures and director types. There are a few factors determining board meeting attendance. Outside directors of a company with more concentrated ownership or controlled by a more powerful ultimate shareholder are less likely to attend board meetings.

Keywords: board meeting attendance, family controlled firm, ultimate shareholder, firm performance

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Chou, Hsin-I and Chung, Huimin and Yin, Xiangkang, Attendance of Board Meetings and Company Performance: Evidence from Taiwan (October 10, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2188721 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2188721

Hsin-I Chou (Contact Author)

RMIT University ( email )

Australia

University of Otago - Department of Accountancy and Finance ( email )

PO Box 56
Dunedin, 9054
New Zealand

Huimin Chung

National Chiao-Tung University - Graduate Institute of Finance ( email )

Hsinchu 300
Taiwan

Xiangkang Yin

Deakin University ( email )

Melbourne, Victoria
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

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