Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment Among Students and Clerical Workers

29 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2012

See all articles by Maria Bigoni

Maria Bigoni

University of Bologna - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Gabriele Camera

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.

Keywords: non-standard subject pools, prisoner's dilemma, peer punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching

JEL Classification: C90, C70, D80

Suggested Citation

Bigoni, Maria and Camera, Gabriele and Casari, Marco, Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment Among Students and Clerical Workers. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7051. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2189789

Maria Bigoni (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, Bologna 40126
Italy
+390512098134 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/maria.bigoni/en

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Gabriele Camera

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

Orange, CA 92866
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www1.chapman.edu/~camera/

University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
7
Abstract Views
298
PlumX Metrics